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Note 
DWI Source Code Motions after Underdahl 
David Liebow* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Drunk driving is a tremendous problem facing the United 
States, and prosecution of driving while intoxicated (DWI) 
offenses is an important step toward preventing such behavior. 
Perhaps the most important tool law enforcement possesses for 
obtaining DWI convictions is the use of “breathalyzers,” 
machines which purport to reveal the amount of alcohol in a 
tested person’s blood. Recently, DWI defendants have had some 
success in attempting to obtain the source code of such 
machines in order to attack the accuracy of the results. Such 
success, however, has been limited, with courts granting less-
than-full access and machine manufacturers fighting such 
efforts using trade secret and copyright laws. 
This Note investigates the issue of breathalyzer source 
code access, summarizing recent developments in source code 
access case law and identifying remaining legal questions to be 
resolved, and argues that the problem has yet to be 
satisfactorily resolved. Part II describes the current state of 
DWI law, the use of breathalyzers, and the history of the law 
relating to source code access. Part III argues for the need for 
source code access, analyzes the current law’s fairness to 
prosecutors, defendants, and machine manufacturers, and 
proposes a solution. This Note concludes that the current, 
limited access that courts have granted DWI defendants to 
breathalyzer source code is insufficient to protect the right to 
contest evidence and that manufacturers’ interests in 
protecting their intellectual property must be secondary to the 
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defendants’ liberty interest. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF DRUNK DRIVING LAWS, 
BREATHALYZERS, AND SOURCE CODE ACCESS 
A.  AN OLD ADVERSARY: OUR LONG BATTLE AGAINST DRUNK 
DRIVING 
Drunk driving is a tremendous problem facing the United 
States. Over 13,000 people were killed in “alcohol-impaired-
driving” incidents in 2006, accounting for 32 percent of total 
traffic fatalities in the United States, in addition to an untold 
number other of accidents and injuries.1 In 2007, an estimated 
1,427,000 arrests were made for driving while intoxicated.2 The 
cost to the U.S. public for alcohol-related vehicle accidents was 
$114.3 billion in 2000, and about 63 percent of these costs were 
borne by someone other than the drinking driver.3 These 
statistics likely represent only a sliver of the true impact drunk 
driving has on society; the true financial and human costs are 
enormous.4 
Since the beginning of the automotive era, American policy 
has favored the criminal process to address drunk driving.5 
New York and California had impaired driving laws on the 
books before World War I and by the mid-1920s, Connecticut 
was incarcerating hundreds of drivers each year for such 
offenses.6 Early laws were difficult to apply, particularly 
because they were adopted before the advent of reliable tests 
                                                          
 1. NHTSA’S NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING (2008) 1, 
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810801.PDF. 
 2. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2007 Crime in 
the United States: Table 29 (2008), 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html (last visited March 1, 
2010). 
 3. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., IMPAIRED DRIVING IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/impaired_driving_pg2/US.htm 
(last visited March 1, 2010). 
 4. Most statistics account only for alcohol-related accidents, but the total 
costs of drunk driving also include those of the judicial process, incarceration 
of those charged and convicted of DUI, loss of jobs or wages related to loss of 
driving privileges, etc. 
 5. H. LAURENCE ROSS, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY 
FOR SAVING LIVES 42 (1992). 
 6. Id. 
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for alcohol in the body.7 These early laws also followed a 
different form than is often seen today, typically creating a 
presumption of impairment for a blood alcohol content (BAC) 
above .15 percent, a presumption against impairment for BAC 
under .05 percent, and the possibility of impairment between 
these two percentages given corroborating evidence.8 Today, 
many states have both a prima facie statute and a per se 
statute.9 A prima facie statute allows a BAC reading to 
constitute prima facie evidence of impairment, allowing a jury 
to presume intoxication.10 A per se statute, meanwhile, 
criminalizes the operation of a vehicle while having higher than 
a particular BAC, today 0.08 percent in every state.11 Due to 
federal mandate, this 0.08 percent level is down from the 0.10 
percent level often seen in the past.12 According to Professor E. 
John Wherry, “[a] per se violation is a strict liability or status 
offense for which few, if any, defenses are available.”13 A 
reliable and accurate tool for measuring BAC, then, is helpful 
for enforcing prima facie statutes and necessary for per se 
statutes. 
B.  OUR MOST USEFUL TOOL: THE USE OF BREATH TESTING 
EQUIPMENT IN THE DWI FIGHT 
Several companies manufacture machines, popularly 
referred to as “breathalyzers,” which purport to measure BAC 
through the use of breath testing. 14 Among the most popular of 
                                                          
 7. See id. at 41–42. 
 8. Id. at 42–43. 
 9. See David Polin, Annotation, Challenges to Use of Breath Tests for 
Drunk Drivers Based on Claim that Partition or Conversion Ratio Between 
Measured Breath Alcohol and Actual Blood Alcohol Is Inaccurate, 90 A.L.R.4th 
155, 161 (2009). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 164. Minnesota law, for example, contains both types in the 
same statute. MINN. STAT. § 169A.20.1(1) (Supp. 2009) (“It is a crime for any 
person to drive . . . any motor vehicle . . . when: the person is under the 
influence of alcohol . . . .); MINN. STAT. § 169A.20.1(5) (Supp. 2009) (“It is a 
crime for any person to drive . . . any motor vehicle . . . when: the person’s 
alcohol concentration . . . as measured within two hours of the time, of 
driving . . . the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more . . . .”). 
 12. See 23 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
 13. E. John Wherry, Jr., The Rush to Convict DWI Offenders: The 
Unintended Unconstitutional Consequences, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 429, 437 
(1994). 
 14. See, e.g., Thomas E. Workman Jr., Massachusetts Breath Testing for 
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these machines is the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, manufactured 
by CMI, Inc.15 As described by David Polin: 
[T]hese devices all operate on the basis of a principle called Henry’s 
Law, which states that the concentration of a volatile substance 
dissolved in a liquid is directly proportional to the vapor pressure of 
the volatile substance above the liquid. As one court put the matter, 
in terms of applicability of Henry’s Law to breath testing, “The trick 
is how to formulate the proper ratio of alcohol found in the breath to 
the alcohol found in the blood.” Breath testers apply Henry’s Law to 
the question of whether a driver is intoxicated by measuring the 
amount of alcohol in a known amount of deep-lung (alveolar) breath, 
and calculating from that figure the amount of alcohol in the subject’s 
blood. As blood flows through the deep lungs, the very function of 
which is to exchange gases between the blood and the atmosphere, 
alcohol in the blood will escape into the exhaled breath, where it may 
be measured by a breath tester. Theoretically, Henry’s Law allows 
one to calculate the concentration of alcohol in the blood from the 
amount that escapes into the breath. To precisely apply it, however, 
in the manner of a physicist in the laboratory, one would have to 
control the variable factors, such as temperature and atmospheric 
pressure, or account for them in the calculations. In practice, in every 
American jurisdiction where breath testing is employed, blood-alcohol 
concentration is calculated by multiplying the percentage of alcohol in 
the breath by 2100.16 
Not every person has this “partition ratio” of 2100:1, 
however.17 Ratios vary among individuals, and experts 
commonly cite ranges from 1100:1 to 3400:1.18 A mistaken 
partition ratio will cause significantly erroneous results—
people with a lower ratio may have their BAC overestimated 
and those with a higher ratio may have their BAC 
underestimated.19 Research has shown that many other factors 
can influence the results of a breathalyzer, as well. A person’s 
gender and race are among the intrinsic factors that can impact 
his partition ratio.20 Research has shown that several external 
                                                          
Alcohol: A Computer Science Perspective, 8 J. HIGH TECH L. 209, 211 (2008). 
“Breathalyzer” is the name of a particular, trademarked machine, but it is 
used popularly to describe the machines as a group and will be similarly used 
here. 
 15. CMI, Inc., Intoxilyzer 5000EN, 
http://www.alcoholtest.com/intox5000.htm (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 16. Polin, supra note 9, at 160. 
 17. Paul Schop, Is DWI DOA?: Admissibility of Breath Testing Evidence in 
the Wake of Recent Challenges to Breath Testing Devices, 20 SW. U. L. REV. 
247, 257 (1991). 
 18. Id. at 258. 
 19. Id. at 257. 
 20. Id. at 261–62. 
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factors can affect a breathalyzer test result, as well. These 
include the presence of unmetabolized alcohol in the mouth,21 
variations in body temperature,22 diabetes, consumption of 
paint thinners, and adherence to the Atkins Diet23 are just 
some of the reasons for a possibly false positive result. 
Moreover, in at least one state, the prosecution need not prove 
breathalyzer results within a margin of error.24 Given that 
extremely high stakes can be involved, with some states having 
felony-level DWI sentences, 25 the potential for serious error is 
troubling. 
Many DWI defendants have found themselves with few 
defenses. Some have attacked the 2100:1 partition ratio 
assumed by breathalyzers either as a general matter26 or as-
applied to their own cases.27 Some DWI defendants, finding 
limited success with these strategies,28 have attempted to fight 
their cases—often charged under per se statutes—by attacking 
the accuracy of the breathalyzer itself. This approach has 
frequently proven difficult, however, due to a presumption of 
reliability afforded breathalyzers in some states.29 As 
information about the inner workings of the machines has been 
                                                          
 21. DOUGLAS V. HAZELTON, MINNESOTA DWI HANDBOOK § 16:6, at 202–
03 (Thompson West 2009–10) (citing tests in which subjects with no blood 
alcohol content have blown up to 0.18, more than twice the legal limit, results 
caused entirely from mouth alcohol). 
 22. Id. § 16:16, at 209–10 (“A change of 1 degree C in the temperature of 
expired breath will change the breath alcohol concentration and hence the 
apparent blood: breath ratio by 6.5%.”); Workman, supra note 14, at 222 
(“[F]or each increase in body temperature of one degree centigrade, breath 
alcohol results are inflated by 7.5%.”). 
 23. Charles Short, Note, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code 
Discovery in Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 177, 178 (2009). 
 24. HAZELTON, supra note 21 § 16:14, at 208 (stating that, in Minnesota, 
it is not required to prove Intoxilyzer results within a margin of error). 
 25. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.24 (Supp. 2009) (promulgating a felony DWI 
charge with a maximum sentence of seven years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 
(2004) (promulgating a maximum DWI sentence of thirty years). 
 26. Polin, supra note 9, at 16672. 
 27. Id. at 172–74. 
 28. Id. at 170–72, 173–74. 
 29. E.g., HAZELTON, supra note 21 § 16:2, at 197–99 (“If the Intoxilyzer 
test is administered by a certified operator who testifies that the instrument is 
in proper working order, the chemicals are in proper working order, the 
chemicals are in proper condition, and the room air results are within 
acceptable limits, this constitutes a prima facie case of reliability.”). 
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kept secret by their manufacturers30 and some states have 
foreclosed the possibility of normal discovery of additional 
information about the machines,31 many defendants have been 
forced to accept the law’s circular logic: “the machine is reliable 
because it produces results; the results are right because the 
machine is reliable.”32 
C.  BREAKING THE CODE: MINNESOTA DEFENDANTS’ QUEST FOR 
BREATH TESTER SOURCE CODE 
Recently, defendants seeking a new avenue for attacking 
the evidence against them have taken to moving for the 
discovery of source code underlying the machine’s software. 33 
In the past, this had met with mixed results.34 Lately, however, 
defendants have found some success. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent line of Underdahl35 
rulings has promulgated the rights for and limitations on the 
ability of DWI defendants and implied consent petitioners36 to 
obtain the source code for Minnesota’s breathalyzer machines. 
In Underdahl I, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered 
whether state trial courts had the jurisdiction to order the 
State to disclose the source code for Minnesota’s breathalyzer 
equipment and whether such code was discoverable.37 After a 
                                                          
 30. E.g., Workman, supra note 14, at 228 (“Manufacturers often claim 
that the source code is a trade secret, and cannot be disclosed.”). 
 31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(4) (2008). 
 32. Short, supra note 23, at 178. 
 33. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 369 n.16 (2006) (“Source code is 
the code that programmers write . . . . A program is (ordinarily) written in 
source code, but to be run it must be converted into a language the computer 
can process.” It is converted to “object code”, machine-readable language 
written in strings of 0s and 1s, by a program called a “compiler.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Short, supra note 23, at 185–89. 
 35. In re Com’r of Pub. Safety (Underdahl I), 735 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 
2007); State v. Underdahl (Underdahl II), 749 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2008); State v. Underdahl (Underdahl III), 767 N.W.2d 677, 685–87 
(Minn. 2009). 
 36. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52 (Supp. 2010) (establishing that in Minnesota, 
certain circumstances, including an Intoxilyzer test reading over 0.08, can 
trigger a driver’s license revocation under provisions of the “implied consent” 
law); e.g., HAZELTON, supra note 21 § 2:19–24, at 22–24 (explaining that such 
revocations are subject to both administrative and judicial review, the latter 
being in the form of a contested civil hearing). MINN. STAT. § 169A.53 (Supp. 
2010) (establishing that in such hearings, the individual is the petitioner, and 
the Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety is the respondent). 
 37. Underdahl I, 735 N.W.2d 706. 
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trial court granted implied consent petitioner (and DWI 
defendant) Dale Underdahl’s discovery motion for disclosure of 
the equipment’s source code, the Commissioner of Public Safety 
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition.38 
According to Underdahl I, The Commissioner argued that a 
Minnesota statute presuming the reliability of a breath test39 
divest[ed] the district court of jurisdiction to order the additional 
discovery. In the alternative, the commissioner argued that if the 
court had jurisdiction, it abused its discretion by ordering discovery of 
source code that the commissioner claimed was not in its possession, 
custody, or control and was, therefore, nondiscoverable. The 
commissioner also argued that due process did not require discovery 
of the source code because the code was proprietary to CMI and thus 
unavailable to the state.40 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals denied the petition.41 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court found that the Commissioner had 
met none of the elements justifying a writ of prohibition: (1) 
that the district court is about to exceed its jurisdiction, (2) that 
the order at issue relates to an outcome-determinative matter, 
(3) that the information in question is “clearly not discoverable 
and for which there is no adequate remedy at law,”42 and (4) 
that the issue “relates to a rule of practice affecting all 
litigants.”43 In finding against the second element, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, though refusing to decide copyright 
issues raised by the parties, did not disturb the findings of the 
district court and court of appeals that the contract between 
Minnesota and CMI gave Minnesota ownership of the 
machine’s source code.44 The court also found “that the 
commissioner’s ability to enforce its contract with CMI 
constitutes an adequate legal remedy.”45 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s later opinion in 
Underdahl III46 clarified the Underdahl I ruling and, 
subsequently, the Underdahl line of cases has been called the 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 708. 
 39. See MINN. STAT. § 634.16 (Supp. 2010). 
 40. Underdahl I, 735 N.W.2d at 709. 
 41. Id. at 709–10. 
 42. Id. at 711 (citing Thermorama, Inc. v. Shiller, 135 N.W.2d 43, 46 
(Minn. 1965)). 
 43. Id. at 713 (citing Thermorama, 135 N.W.2d at 46). 
 44. Id. at 712–13. 
 45. Underdahl I, 735 N.W.2d 706, 713 (Minn. 2007). 
 46. State of Minnesota v. Underdahl (Underdahl III), 767 N.W.2d 677, 
685–87 (Minn. 2009). 
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“friendliest” in the country for allowing defendants access to 
breathalyzer source codes.47 Underdahl III is the culmination of 
numerous attempts since 2006 by DWI defendants to obtain the 
source code of the CMI-manufactured Intoxilyzer 5000EN,48 the 
model of breathalyzer used in Minnesota.49 Two defendants, 
Dale Underdahl and Timothy Brunner, were arrested in 
Dakota County, Minnesota in 2006 and 2007, respectively.50 
Underdahl was charged with one count of misdemeanor fourth-
degree and one count of gross misdemeanor third-degree DWI. 
Brunner was charged with one count of felony first-degree 
DWI.51 Underdahl’s third-degree charge was based entirely on 
an Intoxilyzer test, while Brunner’s charge was based partly on 
an Intoxilyzer reading.52 Both brought motions to discover the 
Intoxilyzer source code, and the respective trial courts granted 
the motions.53 The State of Minnesota subsequently appealed 
the rulings of both trial courts and the court of appeals 
combined and reversed both cases, on the basis that Underdahl 
and Brunner had made “inadequate showings in the district 
court on the relevancy of the source code.”54 
In reversing, the Minnesota Court of Appeals relied on a 
discovery rule allowing a trial court to require disclosure where 
“the information may relate to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant or negate the guilt or reduce the culpability of the 
defendant as to the offense charged.”55 Though Underdahl 
made little attempt at a threshold showing of relevance, 
Brunner made a significant effort.56 Still, the court of appeals 
found that 
respondents have not shown what an Intoxilyzer “source code” is, how 
it bears on the operation of the Intoxilyzer, or what precise role it has 
in regulating the accuracy of the machine. Accordingly, there is no 
showing as to what possible deficiencies could be found in a source 
code, how significant any deficiencies might be to the accuracy of the 
                                                          
 47. Short, supra note 23, at 187. 
 48. Complaint ¶21, Minnesota v. CMI of Kentucky, Inc., Civ. No. 08–603, 
2008 WL 2276445, at *9 (D. Minn. March 3, 2008). 
 49. HAZELTON, supra note 21 § 16:3, at 199–201. 
 50. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d at 680–81. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Underdahl II, 749 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 55. Id. at 120 (citing MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01, subd. 2(3)). 
 56. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Minn. 2009). 
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machine’s results, or that testing of the machine, which defendants 
are permitted to do, would not reveal potential inaccuracies without 
access to the source code.57 
With that finding, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled 
that the trial courts’ decision to order “discover[y of] the 
Intoxilyzer source code was an abuse of discretion.”58 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed 
procedural issues before moving on to decide the showing 
required to support a source code motion, an issue of first 
impression in Minnesota.59 Without so much as a cursory 
explanation, the court adopted the level of showing required “in 
cases where the defendant has requested to review confidential 
information,”60 citing cases involving crime victim medical 
records. The standard the court chose was to require “some 
plausible showing that the information sought would be both 
material and favorable to [the] defense.”61 On that matter, the 
court reversed as to Brunner’s case but affirmed as to 
Underdahl’s. The supreme court said that “Underdahl made no 
threshold evidentiary showing whatsoever,”62 and held that 
“even under a lenient showing requirement, Underdahl failed 
to make a showing that the source code may relate to his guilt 
or innocence.”63 Brunner, however, had 
submitted a memorandum and nine exhibits to support his request 
for the source code. The memorandum gave various definitions of 
“source code.” The first exhibit was the written testimony of David 
Wagner, a computer science professor at the University of California 
in Berkeley, which explained the source code in voting machines, the 
source code’s importance in finding defects and problems in those 
machines, and the issues surrounding the source code’s disclosure. 
The next exhibits detailed Brunner’s attempts to obtain the source 
code, both from the State and CMI. The last exhibit was a copy of a 
report prepared on behalf of the defendants in New Jersey litigation 
about the reliability of New Jersey’s breath-test machine.64 
As to Brunner’s case, the court found that the “submissions 
show that an analysis of the source code may reveal deficiencies 
                                                          
 57. Underdahl II, 749 N.W.2d at 122. 
 58. Id. at 123. 
 59. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d at 681–84. 
 60. Id. at 684. 
 61. Id. at 684–85 (citing State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 
1992)). 
 62. Id. at 685. 
 63. Id. at 686. 
 64. Id. at 685. 
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that could challenge the reliability of the Intoxilyzer and, in 
turn, would relate to Brunner’s guilt or innocence.”65 
Finally, the court faced the question of whether Minnesota 
was in possession of the Intoxilyzer’s source code. In finding 
that it was, the court cited its ruling in Underdahl I along with 
the language of the request for proposal (RFP) for the 
Intoxilyzer, which included a provision “stat[ing] that any 
copyrightable material would ‘be the property of the State and 
are by this Contract assigned to the State.’”66 Justices Alan 
Page and Paul Anderson dissented as the decision concerned 
Underdahl, with Page writing that the majority put a burden 
on defendants greater than that which the rule67 required.68 
After the Underdahl I ruling, the way appeared clear for 
defendants’ successful demands for the source code of the 
Intoxilyzer. Minnesota, however, was not in actual possession 
of the code and, thus, could not turn it over to defendants and 
petitioners.69 Between the ruling in Underdahl I and the 
rulings in Underdahl II and III, the State of Minnesota filed 
suit against CMI in federal court seeking, among other things, 
a declaration that the State was the owner of the copyrights in 
question, an order requiring production of the code, and money 
damages.70 After a first attempt at settlement through a 
consent judgment was rejected by the court due in part to 
concerns over “meaningful access” to and delivery of the source 
code,71 a second attempt was approved. The resulting order lays 
out the access that Minnesota litigants have to the Intoxilyzer 
source code.72 
The order requires CMI to provide access to the source code 
in several forms. First, and perhaps most important, it allows 
“Authorized Minnesota litigants, their counsel, or experts” 
                                                          
 65. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Minn. 2007). 
 66. Id. at 686 n.6 (quoting Underdahl I, 735 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Minn. 
2007)). 
 67. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01, subd. 2(3). 
 68. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d at 688 (Page, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“I conclude that the source code relates to Underdahl’s 
guilt or innocence and that, under Rule 9.01, subd. 2(3), its disclosure is 
required.”). 
 69. Complaint, supra note 48, at *2. 
 70. Id. at *17–*18. 
 71. Minnesota v. CMI of Kentucky, Inc. (CMI), Civ. No. 08–603, 2009 WL 
2163616, at *7–*8 (D. Minn. July 16, 2009). 
 72. Id. at *1–*3. 
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access to the source code, the Intoxilyzer itself, and related 
equipment and tools at CMI’s headquarters in Kentucky.73 
Access to the code is to be without cost, but the reviewer is 
prohibited from copying the code verbatim “except as necessary 
for meaningful expert review,” as well as from retaining any 
portion of the source code upon leaving the facility in any 
case.74 The order requires that other steps be taken by 
reviewers to protect the secrecy of the code, including that any 
filing of the code with a court be done under seal.75 Finally, the 
on-site review portion of the order requires CMI to “cooperate, 
assist, and take reasonably necessary measures to ensure a 
meaningful review of the Source Code and to protect the 
integrity of all aspects of the Source Code review.”76 Next, the 
order requires CMI to “make the Source Code available to 
Authorized Minnesota litigants in Minnesota in a printed, 
hardbound book format . . . .”77 The book is to include the entire 
source code, save the portions dealing with the Intoxilyzer’s 
security features, is not to leave Minnesota, and CMI may 
charge up to $250 for a copy ($125 for “publicly funded 
defenses”).78 The order also allows for further good-faith 
negotiation where the access provided for in the order is 
insufficient, as well as allowing for further intervention by the 
court if necessary.79 The order leaves exclusive ownership of 
the source code with CMI, except for the portions developed for 
the Minnesota model of the Intoxilyzer.80 Finally, “authorized 
Minnesota litigant” is defined81 and the permitted uses of the 
code are delineated.82 
                                                          
 73. Id. at *3. 
 74. Id. at *4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. CMI, Civ. No. 08–603, 2009 WL 2163616, at *4 (D. Minn. July 16, 
2009). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at *4–*5 
 79. Id. at *5. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (explaining the basic requirements are that the litigant must be a 
party to a DWI or implied consent case, a judge must have ordered the 
production of the source code and found it relevant, the judge have issued a 
protective order protecting the code, and anyone having access to the code 
have executed a non-disclosure agreement). 
 82. CMI, Civ. No. 08–603, 2009 WL 2163616, at *6 (D. Minn. July 16, 
2009) (setting forth the sole purpose is for prosecuting or defending DWI and 
implied consent cases. Experts and attorneys are authorized to share reports 
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The impact of the settlement is still being felt. A “Source 
Code Coalition” of criminal defense attorneys has formed “to 
share the costs and the benefits of computer software and 
infrared breath-alcohol machine experts and their findings.”83 
The Minnesota Department of Public Safety has also prepared 
to retain an expert should problems with the source code be 
found.84 Due in part to the prospect of source code challenges to 
breath test results, blood and urine test submissions in 
Minnesota, DWI cases have doubled, resulting in significant 
laboratory backlogs.85 
III.  TEST FAILURE: THE DEFENDANT’S NEED FOR 
SOURCE CODE ACCESS AND CURRENT LAW’S 
SHORTCOMINGS 
This Section will explain the need for defendants to have 
robust access to breathalyzer testing, including source code 
access, to satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause. It 
goes on to describe how the Underdahl line of cases fall short in 
providing such access. 
A.  THE SILENT WITNESS: WHY JUSTICE REQUIRES DEFENDANTS 
TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE SOURCE CODE 
In prosecutions for DWI under prima facie statutes, a 
breathalyzer reading is only one piece of evidence which a 
prosecution may introduce against a defendant, albeit an 
important one. By contrast, under per se statutes, a 
breathalyzer test result is nearly enough alone to convict a 
defendant.”86 In few other situations is a single piece of 
evidence so vital to a case’s success or failure. Given the 
essential nature of breathalyzer evidence in a case charged 
under a per se statute, the due process concerns regarding 
source code access cannot be overstated, particularly when 
                                                          
and offer testimony on behalf of different clients and prospective clients, but 
the reports and testimony are limited to Minnesota courts.). 
 83. Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice, MSCJ Source Code Coalition 
Membership Page, http://www.mscj.org/sourcecodecoalition.html (last visited 
March 1, 2010). 
 84. Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Intoxilyzer 5000EN 
Court Challenge Frequently Asked Questions 2, available at 
http://www.bca.state.mn.us/Intoxilyzer5000ENFAQs.pdf. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 10–13. 
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coupled with the already significant concerns about the 
reliability and accuracy of breathalyzer evidence.87 
The Confrontation Clause of the United States 
Constitution establishes the right to confront witnesses in a 
criminal prosecution.88 This is a “bedrock procedural 
guarantee”89 and “to deprive an accused of the right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.”90 
Certainly, in almost any DWI prosecution, there are witnesses 
available for the prosecution and defense to call. The citing or 
arresting peace officer, for example, is almost sure to be called 
by one of the sides. The person administering a breath test, if 
not the same officer, is also very likely to be called as a 
witness.91 Even in a prosecution under a per se statute, these 
witnesses are important for the prosecution’s attempt to meet 
its burden of proof and the defense’s attempt to raise 
reasonable doubt. However, the report produced by the breath 
testing equipment itself effectively acts as another witness. If 
the parties are left without access to the machine’s source code, 
the tester is effectively a “black box” whose accuracy and 
reliability cannot be evaluated on the basis of a thorough 
analysis of the tester’s operation. 
United States Supreme Court Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence has held that testimonial evidence may be 
admitted through a third party, but the Court claims to have 
“remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding [of the Sixth 
Amendment]: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from 
trial have been admitted only where the declarant is 
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior 
                                                          
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 14–25. 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against 
him . . . .”). 
 89. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (citing Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)). 
 90. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405. 
 91. While not experts, “[t]he BCA trains all Intoxilyzer 5000 operators at 
a 36-hour training course involving classroom teaching followed by a hands-on 
training with volunteer drinkers. Certification course handbooks are available 
from the BCA. http://www.bca.state.mn.us/Lab/Documents/breath.html.” 
HAZELTON, supra note 21 § 16:2, at 197–99. The Intoxilyzer test must be 
conducted “by a certified operator who testifies” to proper working order and 
conditions to constitute “a prima facie case of reliability.” Id. 
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opportunity to cross-examine.”92 Later, the Court held that 
statements “are testimonial when the circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”93 
A breathalyzer test administered after an arrest on suspicion of 
drunk driving is for the exclusive purpose of providing a basis 
for prosecution.94 Furthermore, while the arrestee usually has 
the right to refuse the test,95 additional criminal penalties may 
apply for the refusal.96 The operator of a breathalyzer machine 
may be able to testify to the machine’s calibration and proper 
use, but such an operator is extremely unlikely to qualify as an 
expert or to know the details of the machine’s design or 
programming.97 As such, operator testimony seems insufficient 
to satisfy Confrontation Clause demands. The breathalyzer 
report, then, is effectively an admissible testimonial statement 
despite the unavailability of the machine’s source code and the 
defendant’s inability to have analyzed the code. 
Others have considered the issue of whether source code is 
testimonial under Crawford v. Washington,98 in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation 
Clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness 
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, 
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.’”99 Charles Short cites the “powerfully persuasive” 
effect of breathalyzer results on a jury, concluding that the use 
of such testing “implicates the same concerns that arise in 
Confrontation Clause cases.”100 Courts, too, have occasionally 
discussed the Confrontation Clause implications of restricting 
challenges to the reliability of breathalyzer results.101 Notably, 
                                                          
 92. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 93. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 94. Short, supra note 23, at 197. 
 95. But cf. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52(1) (Supp. 2010) (stating that peace 
officers in Minnesota may obtain a test where probable cause exists to believe 
an arrestee has committed criminal vehicular homicide or injury, despite the 
arrestee’s refusal). 
 96. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.20(2) (Supp. 2010). 
 97. HAZELTON, supra note 21 § 16:2, at 197–99. 
 98. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 99. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). 
 100. Short, supra note 23, at 197. 
 101. State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 163–70 (N.J. 2008) (explaining that the 
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however, such discussion is absent in the Underdahl cases. 
Other courts have sidestepped the issue.102 There has been no 
ruling that has found a clear Confrontation Clause problem in 
the use of breath test results without the underlying source 
code. However, much of this authority predates the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts,103 in which the Court “held that a state forensic 
analyst’s lab report that is prepared for use in a criminal 
prosecution is subject to the demands of the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.”104 While the report at 
issue in Melendez-Diaz was a drug analysis,105 there are 
obvious similarities between such an analysis and a 
breathalyzer report. Both purport to be scientifically accurate 
analyses of chemical compounds, both are prepared for use in a 
criminal prosecution, and both are crucial pieces of evidence in 
such litigation. If a breathalyzer report is found to be 
sufficiently analogous to the report in Melendez-Diaz, that 
precedent may serve to require the breathalyzer source code—
analogous to the analyst authoring the laboratory report—to be 
accessible to the defendant. 
Given that no court has yet found the Confrontation Clause 
directly implicated by the absence of breathalyzer source code 
despite the number of appellate rulings regarding the issue of 
litigant access to such code, it seems that DWI defendants face 
an uphill battle in convincing courts to find a Confrontation 
Clause violation. However, it remains “unjust to convict a 
defendant largely on the breath test result issued by a machine 
whose technical details are undiscoverable.”106 Defendants who 
are denied access to breathalyzer source code or whose access is 
excessively limited should continue to bring challenges under 
                                                          
New Jersey Supreme Court has found that having the operator of a breath 
testing machine available to testify is sufficient to satisfy Confrontation 
Clause issues, further finding no constitutional problems with the 
admissibility of breath tester foundational documents and results); Short, 
supra note 23, at 198–99 (citing several Florida cases). 
 102. Commonwealth v. House, No. 2008-SC-000114-DG, 2009 WL 2705919, 
at *3 (Ky. Aug. 27, 2009). 
 103. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 104. Oyez Project, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, U.S. Supreme Court 
Case Summary & Oral Argument, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2008/2008_07_591/ (last visited May 3, 2010). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Short, supra note 23, at 196. 
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the Confrontation Clause, particularly in the wake of Melendez-
Diaz, and courts should rule that defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights are violated when they are deprived of the 
chance for a meaningful review of a breathalyzer and its 
underlying source code. 
B.  UNDERDAHL’S UNDERPERFORMANCE: AN INADEQUATE 
PRECEDENT 
The Underdahl line of cases, despite setting a Minnesota 
Supreme Court-level precedent called “the friendliest [in the 
country] in response to attempts by the defense to obtain 
discovery of breath testing machine source code,”107 did not go 
far enough in ensuring defendants the right to contest the 
reliability of their Intoxilyzer test results. In perhaps an even 
worse result, Underdahl III’s failure to delineate between the 
acceptable and unacceptable levels of threshold showing 
required to obtain access to the source code leaves enormous 
discretion to trial judges over whether to grant disclosure 
requests on an issue that seems to cry out for uniform 
treatment. 
Underdahl I was decided on the narrow procedural ground 
of the denial of a petition for a writ of prohibition.108 While the 
Underdahl I court did make important rulings, the scope of the 
opinion was not lost on lower courts.109 The first of two main 
holdings from Underdahl I was that Minnesota trial courts had 
jurisdiction to hear challenges to the Intoxilyzer’s validity.110 
The second was that the court could not “conclude that the 
district court ordered the production of [the Intoxilyzer source 
code] that is clearly not discoverable.”111 The first holding, 
while merely jurisdictional on its face, made clear that district 
courts were not bound to meekly accept the prima facie 
reliability of the Intoxilyzer as sacrosanct. The second holding, 
                                                          
 107. Id. at 187. 
 108. That the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals in 
Underdahl I is perhaps not surprising given that “[a] writ of prohibition is an 
extraordinary remedy and is only used in extraordinary cases.” Underdahl I, 
735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 2007) (citing Thermorama, Inc. v. Shiller, 135 
N.W.2d 43, 46 (Minn. 1965)). 
 109. Had the scope of the ruling been more broad, it would have likely 
preemptively settled Underdahl II. 749 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 110. Underdahl I, 735 N.W.2d at 711. 
 111. Id. at 713. 
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while it allowed for the possibility that Intoxilyzer source code 
was discoverable, remained a far cry from saying that the code 
was discoverable. The court left unanswered questions about 
the ownership and copyright of the source code, whether the 
code was affirmatively discoverable (as opposed to “not 
undiscoverable”), and who could access it. These issues were 
finally resolved by Underdahl III. 
Underdahl III highlighted the deficiencies with the 
Underdahl I ruling, creating some of its own as well. The first 
major error the Underdahl III court made was in the standard 
it selected for a showing required to win a discovery order. The 
court admitted that it had “not previously stated what showing 
is required to support a district court’s conclusion that 
information may relate to a defendant’s guilt or innocence in a 
DWI case.”112 In attempting to rectify that failure, however, the 
court compounded the problem by adopting an unjustified and 
inappropriate standard. As noted by the concurrence and 
dissent, the standard113 the Underdahl III court chose is higher 
than the applicable Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure.114 
Worse, the court provided no reasoning in adopting such a 
heightened required showing standard. In fact, the standard 
the court adopted was promulgated in cases dealing with the 
discovery of medical records for victims of violent crimes.115 
While a confidentiality interest arguably exists in the 
Intoxilyzer source code—namely, CMI’s trade secret 
assertion116—the court made no mention of this. Even had the 
court named the confidentiality interest implicated, it would 
have had to find that the interest in question was significant 
enough to demand a balance with the defendants’ liberty 
interest. Presumably, this would not have been easy for the 
court; “[i]n contrast to the important liberty interests of a DUI 
defendant, the interests of the breath testing machine’s 
                                                          
 112. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn. 2009). 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 114. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 115. E.g., State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992) (overturning 
the district court’s discovery order of a confidential file because the defense 
offered no theories on how the file “could be related to the defense or why the 
file was reasonably likely to contain information related to the case”). 
 116. This interest only remains plausible due to the court’s prior 
unwillingness to decide the copyright issue which both sides briefed in 
Underdahl I. The court concluded “that we cannot decide the copyright issues 
raised.” Underdahl I, 735 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn. 2007). 
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manufacturer are relatively light.”117 Further, and again as 
pointed out by the concurrence and dissent, the court’s choice of 
a heightened showing standard caused an absurd result to be 
reached.118 The court’s ruling in Underdahl I entitled 
Underdahl to the source code in his civil implied consent 
proceeding, but not in his criminal DWI case.119 Justice Page, 
concurring and dissenting, found it “anomalous that Underdahl 
is entitled to have access to the source code when his right to 
drive is at stake, but he is denied access to that same source 
code when his right to liberty is threatened.”120 
A second major problem with Underdahl III is that it failed 
to provide adequate guidance to lower courts regarding the 
regarding the sufficiency of a showing of need. In Underdahl 
III, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Underdahl’s de 
minimis showing while accepting as adequate the rather robust 
showing made by Brunner.121 The court provided no additional 
clues as to the minimum level of showing required to meet the 
standard it adopted. The majority may have expected lower 
courts to turn to case law based on the Hummel precedent for 
guidance.122 That line of jurisprudence, however, is based on an 
entirely different set of factual circumstances and interests 
from those in Underdahl. The court mentions several times the 
“broad discretion . . . given to district courts in discovery 
matters,”123 but despite this and despite reviewing under an 
“abuse of discretion” standard, the court was willing to 
overturn the district court as to Underdahl’s case. The court 
also apparently does not consider the difficulty for defendants, 
without having any access to the Intoxilyzer or source code, to 
make a satisfactory showing that information about the 
Intoxilyzer could be material to their case. 
The incomplete and inadequate nature of the ruling in 
Underdahl I and the confusing, unexplained adoption of a 
                                                          
 117. Short, supra note 23, at 193 (noting further, “[a] criminal defendant 
seeking source code discovery does not raise the same alarm as a business 
competitor seeking equivalent discovery.”). 
 118. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d 677, 688 (Minn. 2009) (Page, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 685–86. 
 122. See supra note 115. 
 123. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d at 685. 
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required showing standard higher than that in the Minnesota 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and failure to provide further 
guidance under that standard as it relates to DWI cases in 
Underdahl III make the Underdahl line of jurisprudence a 
regrettable mistake. The Minnesota Supreme Court should 
adopt the reasoning suggested by Justice Page’s concurrence 
and dissent in Underdahl III.124 The current state of law is 
unjustly limiting to defendants’ discovery and does not conform 
to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
C.  SETTLING FOR LESS: THE SHORTCOMINGS IN MINNESOTA’S 
FEDERAL SETTLEMENT WITH CMI 
Once it became clear after Underdahl I that Minnesota 
would need to come into actual possession of the Intoxilyzer 
source code to continue prosecuting DWIs and implied consent 
proceedings, the State filed suit against CMI. Despite 
apparently strong legal claims, Minnesota eventually agreed to 
settle its claims against CMI due to “the cost, risk, uncertainty, 
and delay of further protracted and expensive litigation . . . .”125 
The settlement that the federal district court approved was 
actually the second attempt at resolving the case, the first 
agreement having been rejected by the court as providing 
inadequate access to litigants.126 Even the final CMI 
settlement, however, granted insufficient access to the source 
code for defendants in terms of cost and expert analysis. This 
result may have been a troubling example of the conflict of 
interest created by allowing states—prosecuting entities—to 
effectively settle for the rights of individual litigants. 
1.  The Inadequate Settlement 
The final Minnesota-CMI settlement is insufficient in 
several respects. First, it imposes unreasonable costs on DWI 
defendants and implied consent petitioners. While the direct 
costs for access to the source code allowed for in the settlement 
are relatively low, the indirect costs can be very large. To 
access a Minnesota-model Intoxilyzer and to inspect the source 
code of the machine in its native electronic form, the settlement 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 687–88. 
 125. CMI, Civ. No. 08–603, 2009 WL 2163616, at *1 (D. Minn. July 16, 
2009). 
 126. Id. at *7. 
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requires that a litigant, her attorney, or (most practically) her 
expert to travel to Kentucky, where CMI is headquartered.127 
The costs for travel and lodging for even a brief trip are likely 
to be quite high. When added to the cost for retaining an expert 
or in lost wages, the expenses are likely to be prohibitive for all 
but the wealthiest and most devoted litigants. A coalition of 
Minnesota defense attorneys, including appointed public 
defenders, has formed to share the costs of such an endeavor.128 
Still, this joint-venture is far from an ideal solution. The costs 
involved in a source code challenge effectively limit all but the 
wealthiest and most devoted litigants to hiring those attorneys 
who are members of the coalition. The price tag associated with 
sending an expert to CMI, and/or the inconvenience of going 
oneself, all but prevents litigants from having any sort of 
individualized testing performed with or on the Intoxilyzer. 
Second, the Minnesota-CMI settlement does not allow for 
sufficiently broad expert analysis. The trade secret protection 
aspects of the settlement effectively prevent meaningful 
copying of the source code for later analysis.129 This further 
drives up costs by requiring a reviewer of the source code to 
physically remain at CMI’s facility during the review. It also 
restricts the tools available to the reviewer to whatever CMI 
provides or he can bring with him to the facility. 
Finally, the Minnesota-CMI settlement awards ownership 
of the source code, presumably including copyright, to CMI, 
except for those portions developed under the Request For 
Proposal for the Minnesota model of the Intoxilyzer. While the 
State of Minnesota likely has little interest in ownership of the 
Intoxilyzer programming itself, allowing CMI continued 
ownership of the full source code allows the company to limit 
access to that required by the settlement terms, sharply 
restricting litigants’ use of the code. Given that the State’s suit 
included a claim for ownership of the full source code,130 
allowing CMI to be assigned the intellectual property rights 
should have, at the very least, allowed the State to extract 
                                                          
 127. CMI, Inc., About CMI, http://www.alcoholtest.com/cmiinfo.htm (last 
visited March 26, 2010). 
 128. Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice, MSCJ Source Code Coalition 
Membership Page, http://www.mscj.org/sourcecodecoalition.html (last visited 
March 1, 2010). 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 72–82. 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
LIEBOW_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2010  3:17 PM 
2010] DWI SOURCE CODE MOTIONS 873 
 
favorable terms from CMI elsewhere in the settlement. 
The issues of cost, copying, and ownership were settled with terms 
highly unfavorable to Minnesota litigants. Given the apparent strength of 
Minnesota’s legal claims and CMI’s presumed disinterest in the cost, 
uncertainty, and potentially crippling negative outcome of litigation, 
Minnesota should have insisted on terms more favorable to it and its 
citizens. In particular, Minnesota should have extracted a settlement 
allowing for an Intoxilyzer testing model, the related tools and 
accessories, the Intoxilyzer source code in electronic form, and the 
relevant testing tools to be located in Minnesota for easier access 
resulting in lower-cost analysis. The State could have done this by using 
the claim for ownership of the Intoxilyzer source code, an apparently 
valuable asset to CMI, as a bargaining chip. 
2.  The Inherent Conflict of Interest 
The settlement reached between Minnesota and CMI may 
have been so unfavorable to litigants seeking the code because 
of an inherent conflict of interest on the part of the State of 
Minnesota.131 In Minnesota, the State is the ultimate 
prosecuting authority, though it is represented by respective 
city and county attorney’s offices. The state’s interest, 
politically and financially, is in quick and inexpensive 
convictions for criminal charges, including DWI, and in 
uncontested license revocations. Source code requests, of 
course, have the potential to result in acquittals, and at the 
very least are likely to extend and complicate criminal cases. 
In Minnesota’s suit against CMI, Minnesota’s 
Commissioner of Public Safety was the State’s representative 
and named plaintiff.132 The Office of the Commissioner 
oversees a number of agencies, including Minnesota Driver and 
Vehicle Services and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension 
(BCA),133 which oversees the state’s Intoxilyzer program.134 The 
BCA maintains even now that “the Intoxilyzer is reliable” and 
“that access to the source code is unnecessary to the process of 
determining the accuracy and reliability of the Intoxilyzer 
                                                          
 131. The federal lawsuit’s captioned plaintiff was “State of MINNESOTA, 
by Michael Campion, its Commissioner of Public Safety.” CMI, Civ. No. 08–
603, 2009 WL 2163616 (D. Minn. July 16, 2009). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Organizational Chart, available at 
http://www.dps.state.mn.us/OrgChart/DPS_Org_Chart_October_2009.pdf. 
 134. Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, supra note 84, at 2. 
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5000EN.”135 Attorneys for the State of Minnesota, including 
those representing the Commissioner, also opposed defendant 
access to Intoxilyzer source code throughout the Underdahl 
cases, arguing at times that the State did not have the code,136 
that “the code was proprietary to CMI and thus unavailable to 
the state,”137 and that “due process does not require disclosure 
of the source code.”138 
In suing for the source code, the Commissioner was 
required to argue the very opposite position in federal court as 
he had been advocating for in state court. In addition, he was 
forced to argue for an outcome which might end up proving 
detrimental to the State of Minnesota’s interest. This obvious 
potential conflict of interest may have had no effect on the 
eventual settlement. However, it seems at least reasonable to 
consider the possibility that the Commissioner was less-than-
zealously advocating for the interests of DWI defendants and 
implied consent petitioners, especially given the fact that drunk 
drivers are a politically unpopular group. This possibility seems 
especially plausible when considering that the settlement that 
eventually was reached was the second attempt, the first, even 
less state-favorable attempt having been rejected by the court, 
apparently for not providing enough access to litigants.139 Even 
if the Commissioner’s potential conflict of interest played no 
improper part in the outcome of the case, the mere appearance 
of impropriety can be enough to undermine confidence in his 
office and the settlement. 
During the course of source code litigation, the State of Minnesota 
opposed source code access for defendants and petitioners in Minnesota 
courts before being forced to sue for such access in federal court. Given 
that the eventual settlement with CMI appears not particularly favorable 
for defendants and petitioners, the State’s conflict of interest is troubling. 
In the future, states facing similar situations should provide for attorneys 
independent of the prosecuting authority to ensure that the interests of all 
parties are represented. Alternatively, courts being asked to approve 
settlements should scrutinize the balance of the agreements closely, and 
should not hesitate to reject them if they are inadequately protective of 
                                                          
 135. Id. at 1. 
 136. Underdahl III, 767 N.W.2d 677, 686–87 (Minn. 2009). 
 137. Underdahl I, 735 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Minn. 2007). 
 138. Underdahl II, 749 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
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defendants’ rights. 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The issue of source code access for Minnesota DWI defendants is 
relatively new and continues to develop as an area of law. Until this 
point, however, the access granted to litigants seeking breath tester 
source code has not been adequate to protect the rights of criminal 
defendants and civil implied consent petitioners. Neither the state courts’ 
rulings on the discoverability of source code nor the federal settlement 
with CMI properly weigh the balance of the manufacturers’ interest in 
the intellectual property it purports to own with individuals’ liberty 
interest (in criminal cases) and drivers license interest (in civil 
proceedings). 
Remedies for this inadequate protection of litigants’ rights 
can come either legislatively or judicially. A legislative solution 
would be two-fold: creating a statutory scheme guaranteeing 
defendants and petitioners access to source code and requiring 
the State to return to federal court to attempt to re-litigate the 
settlement with CMI on the ground that the settlement does 
not provide meaningful access for litigants. A judicial scheme, 
on the other hand, could involve overturning Underdahl III to 
the extent that it requires a showing beyond that required by 
the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. A court in the 
Minnesota judicial system could also find that litigants require 
more access to the Intoxilyzer and its source code than the 
federal settlement provides for.140 
 Regardless of how the issues regarding Intoxilyzer source 
code are ultimately resolved, it is clear that the current system 
of breath testing in Minnesota is troubled. Research showing 
the shortcomings of the Intoxilyzer is widespread and 
incontrovertible, and given the serious liberty interests 
involved, such error cannot continue to be tolerated. 
 
                                                          
 140. “The Court . . . notes that its order does not infringe on the Minnesota 
state courts’ authority to conduct subsequent litigation and does not mandate 
that a state court follow the process set forth in this order.” CMI, Civ. No. 08–
603, 2009 WL 2163616, at *9 (D. Minn. July 16, 2009). 
